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COUTHINO, CARO AND COMPANY, INC. AND FIREMAN'SFUND INSURANCE CO. v. M/V SAVA ET. AL.
United States Court of Appeals,Fifth Circuit, 28 June 1988
849F.2d 166
A provision in the bill of lading referring to COGSA does not provide constructive notice of the $500 per package limitation
of liability to a shipper.
FACTS: In December of 1983,Couthino,Caro andCompany,
Inc. iCouthinol, a steel importer, purchased 420 coils of steel
from a manufacturer in Spain for shipment to New Orleans,
Louisiana. The steel was loaded aboard the M/V Sava in Spain
and stowed in holds four and six. Two marine surveyors observed
and recorded the loading.
During the voyage, inclement weather conditions neces
sitated ventilation of the cargo by opening the holds as the M/V
Sava lacked a forced ventilation system to control the dewpoint
in the holds.
When the cargo was discharged in New Orleans in February,
the coils evidenced varying degrees of rusting. A clearly defined
waterline on the coils from hold four and standing water in hold
six, indicated the presence of seawater in both holds. After two
of Couthino's buyers received their portion of the shipment and
complained of heavy rust damage,Couthino collected the coils
at a warehouse in Chicago. Examination of the coils suggested
flooding of the holds during the voyage and carriage of the cargo
in a moisture saturated environment. Subsequently, the damaged
coils were either sold at salvage or subject to depreciation
allowances.
Couthino and its insurer, Fireman's Fund, brought suit
against M/V Sava for the damaged cargo in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The district
court ruled in favor of the shipper,Couthino, but limited the
vessel's liability to $500 per coil. Couthino appealed the order
regarding the limitation of liability. The owner of the M/V Sava
cross-appeals, challenging the lower court's finding concerning
the condition of the cargo.

In order to benefit from this limitation provision, the courts
have held that the carrier bears the initial burden of showing
that it offered the shipper a fair opportunity to avoid the limitation,
General Electric Co. u. M/V Nedlloyd, 817 F.2d 1022 i 2d Cir.
1987),cert denied,
U.S.
, 108 S.Ct. 710,98 L.Ed.2d 661
( 1988). Yet, the circuits differ as to what evidence establishes a
carrier's prima facie case of fair opportunity,Wuerttembergische
u. M/V Stuttgart Express, 711 F.2d 621 15th Cir. 1983). The
district court r:ited prior court rulings which stated that mere
incorporation ofCOGSA by reference is insufficient evidence of
fair notice. However,the district court relied upon the erroneous
premise that the Fifth Circuit had rejected the rationale of these
cases. In so doing, the district court concluded that the bill of
lading,which only mentionedCOGSA,provided the shipper with
adequate notice of § 1304 15l, thereby constituting sufficient
evidence of fair opportunity actually existed. TheCourt of Appe
als for the Fifth Circuit pointed out that, in those cases cited,
inclusion ofCOGSA was not the determinative factor. Instead,
this court relied on evidence that the carrier clearly afforded the
shipper the option to declare a valuation of its cargo after review
ing the various shipping rates.
In the case at bar, the bill of lading contained no such alterna
tive. Therefore, since the carrier did not make its threshold
showing,the shipper has no burden of proof and the M/V Sava is
not entitled to limited liability.
The owner of the M/V Sava contended that the coils were not
delivered to the ship in good condition. Couthino conversely
argued that it sought damages due to the extensive rusting of
the steel while aboard the M/V Sava and not for minor man
ufacturing defects. In Camemint Food Inc. u. Brasileiro, 647
F.2d 347,355 i2dCir. 1981) the court stated that "Plaintiff must
show that the goods were delivered to the carrier free of the
damages for which recovery is sought."
In this instance, expert testimony indicated that the steel was
free of corrosive rust when delivered to the M/V Sava. The
district court correctly reasoned that the coils were in good
condition when the carrier received them and rejected the owner
of the M/V Sava's claim.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the district
court as to finding the M/V Sava liable, reversed the judgment
as to the limitation of liability and remanded the case for a
determination of damages. This decision thus brings the Second
and Fifth Circuit into agreement on this issue.
Susan Lysaght '91
--

ISSUE: Did M/V Sava afford the cargo shipper a fair opportun
ity to avoid the $500/package limitation of liability by merely
adducing a provision in the bill of lading that referred toCOGSA?
ANALYSIS: The Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit de
termined that the clause in the bill of lading did not provide
constructive notice toCouthino of the content ofCOGSA's limi
tation of liability provision.
The court noted that the case hinged on the carrier's and
shipper's respective burden of prooof under Title 46 USC §1304
15l ICOGSAl. This section limits the liability of a carrier to $500
per package for loss or damages in connection with the transpor
tation of goods unless the shipper specifies a desire to increase
the cargo's valuation in excess of that amount.

-

FLOYD v. LYKES BROS. STEAMSHIP CO., INC.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, 9 March 1988
844F.2d 1044
Absent embalming and mortuary facilities, the burial at sea of a deceased seaman rests in the discretion of the ship's captain.
FACTS: James H. Floyd IFloydl was a seaman aboard the S.S.
Shirley Lykes,owned and operated by Lykes SteamshipCompany
of New Orleans, Louisiana !hereinafter "Lykes"l. On August
19, 1983, while the vessel was passing through the Straits of
Gibraltar enroute to Canada and the United States,Floyd met
his demise by heart attack. At sea and eight days from port, the
captain ordered and the crew made ready a burial at sea. On the
following morning,August 20th,a message was sent to Lykes in
New Orleans informing management of the death and pending
burial of the deceased. That afternoon the crew positioned the
flag draped remains at the ships stern and, after a brief service
and eulogy by the captain, Floyd slid to his watery grave. The
captain informed Lykes that the burial had been completed.
Prior to the burial, neither the ship nor Lykes had notified
Floyd's next-of-kin of the death.

Suit was initiated by Maria Floyd IMarial, daughter of the
deceased,in the District Court for the Eastern District of Penn
sylvania, alleging wrongful death and improper disposition of
the remains, against Lykes. The district court granted de
fendant's summary judgment motion and dismissed the wrongful
death count for lack of evidence. As to Count two, improper
disposition of the body, the district court dismissed the claim as
to Maria's brothers, sisters and mother, also plaintiffs, on the
grounds that only the next-of-kin may properly bring such action.
Thereafter, the district court granted Lykes summary motion
and dismissed the complaint. Maria appeals the dismissal of
Count two as to herself only.
(Continued ...)
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Floyd v. Lykes (Cont.)
ISSUE: Is it proper for a ships captain to perform a burial at
sea, without prior notification of the next-of-kin, when the vessel
is eight days from port?

twenty hours from port when the burial was effected. Other
than this easily distinguishable case, the only authority to
support defendant's claim was a publication by the United
States Public Health Service entitled The Ships Medicine Chest
and Medical Aid at Sea. That handbook contained the statement
"[t]oday burial at sea is the exception". But no expansion of this
statement was offered, leaving the reader inconclusive as to
whether the meaning was that death at sea was the exception
today due to advances in medicine and technology, or that lack
of embalming and mortuary facilities was the exception, etc.
Thus the plaintiffs case failed for lack of any evidence in support
of her cause of action.
In affirming the lower court's decision the court of appeals
noted that plaintiff offered no statutes, cases or authorities to
contradict Brambir's holding, that nothing in the Death on the
High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§761-68, or the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.
§688,prohibited burial at sea,and that no abuse of discretion on
the part of the captain had been demonstrated. the court in
sinuated that certain proof not present in the instant case might
have allowed the action to go forward. Examples of such facts
were if the ship had embalming and mortuary facilities (vessels
refrigerated food locker not appropriate),or if the plaintiff had
demonstrated both a willingness to reimburse Lykes for its
expenses for an unplanned docking at a closer port plus the
willingness of the port country to accept an unembalmed
cadaver, or if the captain's decision could be classified as "ar
bitrary, fanciful or unreasonable".
Harold Levy '90

ANALYSIS: Plaintiff argued on appeal that state tort law
established a quasi-property right to the body of the deceased in
the next-of-kin and that state law was or should be incorporated
into the general maritime law. Agreeing that maritime law
applied and citing Igneri v. Cie de Transports Oceaniques, 323
F.2d 257,259 (2d Cir. 1963),cert denied 376 U.S. 949 (1964),the
court held that it could "look to the law prevailing on the land"
only when the maritime law was silent. Absent a maritime
statute, the case should be governed by general maritime case
law, United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 409
(1975); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 160-61
( 1920), and state law may not be applied where it would conflict
with maritime law, Coastal Iron Works, Inc. v. Petty Ray
Geophysical, 783 F.2d 577,582 (5th Cir. 1986).
The court looked to Brambir v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 37 F.
Supp. 906, 907 <S.D.N.Y. 1940), affd mem., 119 F2.d 419 (2d
Cir. 1941), as the leading case on point. In that case a passenger
died eight days from port and the court held that the ship's
master had absolute discretion over the fate of the corpse.
Further,burial at sea is recognized as a viable option by master,
vessel and medical guideboo ks.
Defendant cited Finley v. Atlantic Transport Co., 220 N.Y.
249, 115 N.E. 715 (1917) to support its case. There, defendant
provided an embalmer and morgue and additionally, was only

SCAC TRANSPORT (USA) INC. v. S.S. DANAOS
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 25 Aprill988
845 F.2d 1157
A stevedore whose negligence has been determined to be the proximate cause of the litigation can be vouched into
arbitration proceedings without its consent and be bound by the findings of the arbitrator.
FACTS: The S.S. Danaos was loading cargo on a vessel when
an accident occurred wherein the vessel's Stulken Boom collapsed
when a pin in a winch block failed during the loading of a water
tank truck. The truck, boom and parts of the vessel suffered
damage. The vessel, owned by Danais Shipping Company
(Danais),was under a time charter to Big Lift USA,Inc. and Big
Lift Shipping Company (N.A.) Inc. (Big Lift), collectively which
had contracted with Universal Maritime Service Corp. (Universal)
for the stevedoring services.
The truck's owner SCAC Transport (SCAC) commenced this
action against Danais, Big Lift and the S.S. Danaos in rem.
Danais cross claimed against Big Lift for indemnity. Universal
was brought into the action by a third party claim and was cross
claimed for indemnification by Big Lift. SCAC settled with
Danais. Pursuant to the charter-party between Danais and Big
Lift any dispute was to be arbitrated in London. Universal was
not a party to this agreement.
Big Lift tendered the defense to Universal with regard to the
London arbitration and required Universal to appear in defense
of the action and to indemnify Big Lift. Universal was advised
that refusal or neglect of the notice would bar it from objecting to
the outcome of the arbitration.
The arbitration ruling was in favor of Danais, and the steve
dore's negligence was found to be the proximate cause. Damages
included vessel repairs, loss of charter hire, interest and at
torney's fees. Universal again declined to assume the defense,
when Big Lift informed it that an appeal before the Commercial
Court in London was to be heard. After Universal declined to
assume defense of the claim and prosecution of the special cases,
Big Lift instructed its London solicitors to terminate appeal. Big
Lift then commenced an action in the District Court.
The District Court, affirming the finding of the London arbit
ration as to negligence, found that Big Lift was entitled to
indemnity. The damages awarded, however, did not include
attorney's fees becuase the court determined they were beyond
what Universal could reasonably contemplate when hired as a
stevedore.
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ISSUE:
Whether a stevedore without its consent may be
vouched into an arbitration where the stevedore is the charterer's
indemnitor?
ANALYSIS:
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed the district court and held that absent a particularized
showing of prejudice,a stevedore may be vouched into arbitration
under a charter party by a charterer where the stevedore is the
charterer's indemnitor. The district ' court's decision as to attorney's fees was reversed.
Under the common-law practice of voucher, a defendant or
indemnitee who seek s indemnification from a third party or
indemnitor must serve a notice to defend on the third party. This
notice informs the indemnitor of the action against the de
fendant and offers the opportunity to defend the action.
If the defense is not assumed, the defendant may bring a
separate action later to recover its indemnity. The indemnitor
can dispute the existence and extent of the indemnity. See
Humble Oil & Ref Co. v. Philadelphia Ship Maintenance Co.,
444 F.2d 727 (3rd Cir. 1971). The third party will be collaterally
estopped from relitigating issues decided in the first action in all
of the elements of the adjudicatory procedure are met.
Arbitration is cited as an important, efficient and equitable
means of dispute resolution when arbitrators are experienced in
maritime matters and the evidence is extensive. The Second
Circuit noted the procedural aspects of arbitration and court
adjudication and concluded contrary to the district court's rul
ing that the notice received by Universal had no preclusive
effect; that absent a particularized showing of harm,procedural
differences between arbitration and the judicial process are not
grounds for denying a preclusive effect to vouching in notice.
Universal did not demonstrate any prejudice suffered as a result
of the London arbitration.
For reasons of efficiency vouching is permitted. Stevedores
are well aware that charter parties contain arbitration clauses
to which they as potential indemnitees are bound. Absent a
(Continued ...)

